Cross-modal representations of first-hand and vicarious pain, disgust and fairness in insular and cingulate cortex by Corradi-Dell’Acqua, Corrado et al.
ARTICLE
Received 18 Aug 2015 | Accepted 1 Feb 2016 | Published 18 Mar 2016
Cross-modal representations of ﬁrst-hand and
vicarious pain, disgust and fairness in insular and
cingulate cortex
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The anterior insula (AI) and mid-anterior cingulate cortex (mACC) have repeatedly been
implicated in ﬁrst-hand and vicarious experiences of pain, disgust and unfairness. However,
it is debated whether these regions process different aversive events through a common
modality-independent code, reﬂecting the shared unpleasantness of the experiences or
through independent modality-speciﬁc representations. Using functional magnetic resonance
imaging, we subjected 19 participants (and 19 confederates) to equally unpleasant painful and
disgusting stimulations, as well as unfair monetary treatments. Multivoxel pattern analysis
identiﬁed modality-independent activation maps in the left AI and mACC, pointing to
common coding of affective unpleasantness, but also response patterns speciﬁc for the
events’ sensory properties and the person to whom it was addressed, particularly in the right
AI. Our results provide evidence of both functional specialization and integration within AI
and mACC, and support a comprehensive role of this network in processing aversive
experiences for self and others.
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I
n the last decade, neuroscience research made considerable
efforts to elucidate the neuronal processes underlying our
ability to understand the mind of others1–3. Studies on the
neural bases of empathy revealed that witnessing others’
emotional states such as pain or disgust recruits a network
comprising the anterior insula (AI) and mid-anterior cingulate
cortex (mACC)4–11, both of which are also implicated in our
ﬁrst-person experience of the same aversive feelings12–15.
Furthermore, witnessing transgressions of social norms (unfair
transactions16 or unmoral acts17) has also been associated with
activity in AI and mACC. These results represent an important
cornerstone for embodied approaches of social cognition,
according to which basal sensorimotor experiences, and their
associated neural underpinnings, are instrumental in the
processing of social events18–20.
It has been frequently proposed that neural signals in
AI/mACC might not code for speciﬁc experiences (pain, disgust,
unfairness, and so on), but instead mediate a broader function
across different domains9,10,21. Unlike for the posterior and
middle insula, that receive primary gustatory22,23 and
nociceptive24–26 inputs from thalamic nuclei, the nature of the
information coded by AI/mACC is still unclear. The sensitivity of
these areas to different sensory and affective events9,10,21 might be
interpreted in terms of a common neural coding of features such
as unpleasantness, arousal or even the salience of the
experience27,28. In particular, it has been suggested that
pain-evoked activity in AI/mACC reﬂects a combination of
neural processes similarly engaged by non-nociceptive events,
arguing against the presence of any pain-speciﬁc29 (and possibly
also disgust-speciﬁc) signal.
However, empirical evidence on the functional properties of
AI/mACC has mainly been obtained by neuroimaging techniques
such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), whose
spatial resolution does not allow recording from isolated neurons,
but provides pooled signal from a large volume of grey matter.
It is therefore possible that AI and mACC hold independent
(but intermingled) neuronal populations that encode aversive
states in a modality-speciﬁc (pain, disgust, unfairness) or even
target-speciﬁc (self, other) manner.
In the present study, we investigated whether the neural
processes subserved by AI/mACC are best described in terms of
modality-speciﬁc representations of pain, disgust or unfairness, or
rather in terms of modality-independent features shared by these
different experiences, such as unpleasantness. To this end, we
used multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA) which allows for more
detailed investigation of fMRI activation maps30–32. MVPA
exploits the variability of neural signal over a cortical area that
reﬂects the idiosyncratic distribution of a given neuronal
population across neighbouring voxels. Thus, the identiﬁcation
of shared or independent activity patterns represents a more
stringent assessment of whether two conditions recruit the same
or different neuronal processes30–33. Using MVPA, we compared
activity patterns from 19 female7 volunteers when they were
subjected to either electrical (painful (Ps)/non-painful (nPs)) or
gustatory stimuli (disgusting (Ds)/non-disguting (nDs)), which
were carefully matched for subjective unpleasantness34 (self-
related trials). In separate (other-related) trials, they saw a
befriended confederate receiving equivalent electrical (Po/nPo) or
gustatory (Do/nDo) stimuli5. Finally, participants also performed
an Ultimatum Game (UG) task, in which they faced unknown
people who proposed unfair or moderately fair economic
transactions, either to the participants themselves (Us/Ms) or to
the confederate (Uo/Mo)16,35–39.
First, we tested whether activity patterns evoked in AI/mACC
by ﬁrst-person painful experiences were similar to (or dissociated
from) those evoked by ﬁrst-person disgust, as a neural signature
of modality-speciﬁc or modality-independent coding. Second, we
assessed whether response patterns elicited by ﬁrst-person
experiences were shared with those elicited by vicarious
pain/disgust, as well as unfairness. Third, and most importantly,
we explored the nature of shared information for vicarious
responses. If AI/mACC process others’ affective states in terms of
modality-speciﬁc features (‘it hurts when I see you in pain’, ‘it is
bitter when I see you disgusted’), then activity patterns evoked by
a ﬁrst-person event should generalize to vicarious experience of
the same, but not different, modality. Alternatively, if AI/mACC
process others’ affective states in terms of modality-independent
features (‘it is unpleasant when I see you in pain/disgusted’), then
activity evoked by a ﬁrst-person event should generalize to
vicarious experiences of another modality. Finally, MVPA across
different tasks could also shed light on the nature of the neural
coding of unfairness in AI/mACC: if the role of these regions in
unfairness reﬂects the engagement of disgust-speciﬁc neural
responses (‘unfairness is disgusting’), as previously assumed16,
then the activity patterns elicited during the UG should generalize
to ﬁrst-person disgust, but not pain. Alternatively, if AI/mACC
code unfairness in terms of modality-independent features
(‘unfairness is unpleasant’), then we expect shared information
with both ﬁrst-person pain and disgust.
Our results provide ﬁrst evidence of both shared and
independent coding in AI/mACC. In particular, we found that
left AI and mACC disclose activity patterns which are shared
between different modalities (pain, disgust and unfairness) but
also between ﬁrst-hand and vicarious aversive experiences,
pointing to common coding of affective unpleasantness. Instead,
right AI discloses activity patterns which are speciﬁc for the
events’ sensory properties and the target of the experience.
Results
Behavioural data. Prior to scanning, electrical and gustatory sti-
muli were calibrated on an individual basis to ensure their painful
or disgusting nature (see Methods). During the scanning session,
participants rated the subjective unpleasantness associated with
each stimulus event (see Fig. 1). The analysis of median unplea-
santness ratings revealed that, for both the pain and disgust tasks,
and for each target of the stimulation (self, other), aversive events
were signiﬁcantly more unpleasant than the corresponding neutral
controls (paired t-tests on N¼ 19, all t(18)sZ12.89 and Po0.001;
see Fig. 1a,b). Furthermore, for both pain and disgust, the unplea-
santness of aversive and neutral events was comparable across
targets (paired t-tests all |t(18)s|r1.92, not signiﬁcant (NS), N¼ 19).
No modality-speciﬁc differences were found between pain and
disgust, for each target and for each unpleasantness level (paired t-
tests all |t(18)s|r1.21, NS, N¼ 19).
As the UG comprised a wide range of offers (most unfair,
moderately fair, extremely fair), we used the unpleasantness
ratings acquired during the scanning session to identify, on an
individual basis, a sub-portion of UG trials that were most
comparable with the pain and disgust tasks. Thus, for each
participant, and for each target of the offer, we identiﬁed as
‘aversive’ those UG trials that were rated as the most unpleasant,
whereas the remaining trials whose unpleasantness was closest to
0 were identiﬁed as ‘neutral’ (see Fig. 1c). Supplementary Figure 1
reports all details about the selected trials, with the most aversive
being most frequently associated with unfair offers and neutral
controls being associated with moderately fair (midfair) offers. As
for pain and disgust, unpleasantness was matched across targets,
both for unfair and midfair offers (paired t-tests all |t(18)s|r1.46,
NS, N¼ 19). However, aversive and neutral events in the UG
task were rated as slightly more positive than corresponding
conditions in the pain and disgust tasks (paired t-tests all
t(18)sZ2.35, Po0.05, N¼ 19).
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Neural responses in AI and mACC. As ﬁrst step, we focused on
response patterns in AI and mACC, because these regions have
repeatedly been implicated in both ﬁrst-person and vicarious
pain5,7,8,12,13, disgust4,6,14,15 and unfair UG offers16,36–39.
Furthermore, these regions are part of an intrinsically
connected circuit (called saliency network) that appears
conserved even during rest28. We therefore took advantage of
an independent resting-state session to localize this network in
each subject and to obtain reliable regions-of-interest (ROIs) of
AI and mACC without any bias related to tasks or stimuli.
These ROIs provide subject-speciﬁc AI coordinates which are
consistently connected with mACC and vice versa. See Fig. 2a for
an illustration of the AI–mACC network at the group level, and
Methods section for details.
As manipulation check, we investigated whether activation
patterns in each ROI discriminated between aversive and non-
aversive states (pain, disgust, unfairness), which could occur to
participants themselves or the befriended confederate (within-
task classiﬁcation). A linear kernel support vector machine
(SVM) classiﬁer40 was trained on data from the respective task
and condition, and then tested using cross-validation approaches.
This led, for each participant, to a d 0 parameter that quantiﬁed
the ability of the classiﬁer to detect an aversive state as opposed to
its neutral control (for example, Ps versus nPs). The signiﬁcance
of the d 0 values at the group level was estimated through rigorous
permutation techniques (see Methods). In line with earlier studies
using each task separately, we conﬁrmed that the bilateral AI and
mACC reliably encoded aversive states in all three modalities
and both target-conditions. Repeated measure analysis of
variances (ANOVAs) revealed no signiﬁcant differences across
ROIs in their sensitivity to self-/other-related pain and disgust.
Regions differed, however, in their sensitivity to unfairness,
reﬂecting greater sensitivity of mACC with respect to AI
(see Table 1).
Subsequently, we ran a cross-modal pattern analyses to assess
whether a classiﬁer trained to detect one speciﬁc aversive event
(for example, Ps versus nPs) could also detect aversiveness from
an independent condition (for example, Ds versus nDs) and vice
versa (see Fig. 2b for illustration). Reliable evidence for shared
activity patterns between ﬁrst-hand pain and disgust (Ps versus
nPs2Ds versus nDs; hereafter Ps2Ds) was found in the left AI
and mACC (d 0sZ0.30; permutation-based test corrected for
multiple comparisons for the 3 ROIs: cutoff¼ 0.18, Po0.01,
N¼ 19, see Fig. 3a and Table 2). In contrast, no cross-modal
effects were observed in the right AI (d 0 ¼ 0.02, NS), although this
region reliably encoded both pain and disgust in the within-task
classiﬁcations. Indeed, d 0s in the right AI obtained for within-task
classiﬁcations of both ﬁrst-hand pain and disgust were signiﬁ-
cantly larger than those obtained for the cross-modal effect
(Ps4PS2Ds and Ds4Ps2Ds; d 0 differences (diff-d 0s)Z0.33,
permutation tests on d 0 differences: cutoffsr0.29, Po0.05,
N¼ 19), thus suggesting the presence of modality-independent
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Figure 1 | Trial structure and behavioural results. For (a) pain, (b) disgust and (c) ultimatum game (UG) tasks, trials were introduced by an arrow-shaped
cue whose orientation and colour informed whether the upcoming event affected either the participants themselves (k) or the confederate (.). For the
UG, cues were also associated with the photo of an unknown proposer. Cues (2 s) were followed by a stimulus event of varying unpleasantness (aversive
versus neutral). For the pain task, this consisted of a 1-s-long electrical stimulation delivered to the left wrist. For the disgust task, 0.5ml of liquid was
delivered into the mouth, which had to be swallowed after 4 s when prompted by an instruction screen (3 s). To avoid transfer to the next trial, 2ml of water
were then delivered in the mouth (3 s), again followed by a 3-s swallowing instruction. For the UG, a 4-s screen was presented depicting the offer with 10
coins organized into 2 piles. At the bottom of the screen, the response options ‘accept/reject’ were presented. For each task, stimuli were followed by a
visual analogue scale, which participants used to rate the subjective unpleasantness evoked by the previous stimulation. Inter-trial intervals (ITI) in all three
tasks varied from 2.5 to 7.5 s (average 5 s). For each task, average unpleasantness ratings are displayed in separate subplots (single experiment, sample
size N¼ 19). White bars refer to stimuli directed to the participants (self), whereas striped bars refer to stimuli directed to the confederates (other).
For each subplot, aversive and neutral events are displayed separately along the horizontal axis. Error bars refer to bootstrap-based 95% conﬁdence
intervals.
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(but overlapping) activity patterns for pain and disgust. Results of
a repeated measure ANOVA conﬁrmed differences in cross-
modal effect between ﬁrst-hand pain and disgust across ROIs
(permutation-based ANOVA: F¼ 6.77, cutoff¼ 3.40, Po0.01,
N¼ 19), reﬂecting lower d 0s in right AI relative to both left AI
and mACC (|diff-d 0s|Z0.28, permutation tests on d 0 differences:
|cutoffs|r0.25, Po0.05, N¼ 19). Overall, our data hint that the
neural signal in left AI and mACC may be partly shared between
pain and disgust, whereas the signal in right AI may instead
reﬂect modality-speciﬁc coding.
Having established that AI/mACC disclose both modality-
speciﬁc and modality-independent activity patterns for ﬁrst-hand
pain and disgust, we tested whether these neural responses were
re-activated when the same experiences occurred to the
confederate. This was achieved by assessing whether a classiﬁer
trained at detecting ﬁrst-person pain (or disgust) could success-
fully detect others’ pain (or disgust) and vice versa (cross-target
classiﬁcation: Ps2Po, Ds2Do). For left AI and mACC,
signiﬁcant effects were found for both pain and disgust
(d 0sZ0.21, permutation tests: cutoffsZ0.20, Po0.05 corrected
for the 3 ROIs; except for Ds2Do in left AI: d 0 ¼ 0.19,
signiﬁcant under an uncorrected cutoff¼ 0.15, Po0.05, N¼ 19).
Critically, evidence in left AI and mACC for shared activity
between ﬁrst-hand and vicarious aversive experiences extended to
stimuli of different modalities: that is, between ﬁrst-person pain
and vicarious disgust or ﬁrst-person disgust and vicarious pain
(Ds2Po, Ps2Do: d 0sZ0.30, permutation tests: cutoffsr0.20,
Po0.01 corrected; except for Ds2Po in left AI: d 0 ¼ 0.18,
uncorrected cutoff¼ 0.15, Po0.05, N¼ 19). These ﬁndings reveal
that vicarious pain and disgust elicit neural responses in left AI
and mACC that are partly shared with those associated with
ﬁrst-hand experiences, regardless of whether the experience is of
the same or different modality (see Fig. 3b).
Interestingly, we found no conclusive evidence of shared
activity between ﬁrst-hand and vicarious pain and disgust in right
AI (d 0sr0.12 permutation tests: cutoffsZ0.19, NS; but for
Ds2Po: d 0 ¼ 0.26, Po0.05, N¼ 19). However, the right AI
disclosed reliable detection of pain and disgust in the within-task
classiﬁcation for both self and other (see Fig. 3a,b). Indeed, d 0s
obtained in right AI for the within-task classiﬁcation of
others’ pain and disgust were greater than for the cross-target
classiﬁcations between ﬁrst-hand and vicarious experiences, both
when the modality was the same (diff-d 0 ¼ 0.33, permutation test
of d 0 differences: cutoff¼ 0.25, Po0.01 corrected, N¼ 19) or
different (diff-d 0 ¼ 0.26, cutoff¼ 0.25, Po0.05 corrected, N¼ 19;
see Fig. 3b). Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest a dissociation
in neural responses between ﬁrst-person and vicarious sensations
for both pain and disgust in right AI.
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Figure 2 | ROIs and MVPA overview. (a) Independent component analysis performed on participants’ resting-state data, to map the AI–mACC network28
in an unbiased manner (surface rendering displayed at Po0.001). ROIs were based on signiﬁcant clusters in the bilateral AI and mACC that were then used
for MVPA on independent functional data obtained for the pain, disgust and UG tasks. (b) Processing steps in MVPA. For each ROI, data were extracted
from every constitutive voxels and fed to a SVM classiﬁer40,62, to identify multivoxel patterns informative about an aversive event relative to its
corresponding neutral control (for example, Ps versus nPs). The so trained classiﬁer was then tested on independent data from the same task (within-task
classiﬁcation) or another task, for example, when aversive experiences occur in a different sensory modality (cross-modal classiﬁcation). (c) Matrixes
displaying the results of within-task, cross-target and cross-modal classiﬁcations for each of the three ROIs. In each matrix, row and column labels refer to
classiﬁcation of an aversive state, each relative to its corresponding neutral control: self-related pain (Ps), self-related disgust (Ds), other-related pain (Po),
other-related disgust (Do) and unfairness (U). D’ values from within-task classiﬁcations are displayed in the outer diagonal line of the matrixes.
The remaining cells in the matrixes reﬂect cross-target and cross-modal classiﬁcations. White striped cells refer to d0 effects which are not signiﬁcantly
higher-than-chance, whereas green cells refer to effects signiﬁcantly higher-than-chance. The luminance of green cells reﬂects the magnitude of the
d 0 values. Single experiment, sample size N¼ 19.
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Finally, we investigated whether a classiﬁer trained to detect
unfair (as opposed to marginally fair) UG offers could also detect
ﬁrst-person experiences of pain/disgust and vice versa (Ps2Us,
Ds2Us, Ps2Uo, Ds2Uo). See Supplementary Fig. 2 for
exhaustive representation of the results, which were comparable
regardless of the target of the unfairness. For readability purposes,
here we report effects identiﬁed when combining together self-
and other-related UG trials, which indicated signiﬁcant cross-
modal effects of UG responses for both ﬁrst-person pain and
disgust in left AI and mACC (Ps2U: d 0sZ0.27, permutation
test: cutoff¼ 0.17; Ds2U: d 0sZ0.25, cutoff¼ 0.16; Po0.05
corrected, N¼ 19; see Fig. 3c). Moreover, d 0s were comparable
for cross-modal effects of UG patterns when compared with
either pain or disgust (Ps2U versus Ds2U; |diff-d 0s|r0.20,
permutation tests of d 0 differences: |cutoffs|Z0.23, NS, N¼ 19),
suggesting that neural representations of unfairness were not
speciﬁcally related to disgust experiences. By contrast, no cross-
modal effect was found in right AI (d 0sr0.04, NS), although this
region disclosed reliable detection of unfairness in the within-task
classiﬁcation. Furthermore, in right AI, the d 0s obtained in the
within-task classiﬁcation of unfairness were larger than those
obtained in the cross-modal classiﬁcation (U4Ps2U and
U4Ps2U: diff-d 0Z0.34, permutation tests of d 0 differences:
cutoffsr0.27, Po0.05 corrected, N¼ 19). Finally, results of a
repeated measure ANOVA conﬁrmed differential cross-modal
effects across ROIs for unfair UG offers and both ﬁrst-hand pain
(permutation-based ANOVA, F¼ 4.56, cutoff¼ 3.53, Po0.05,
N¼ 19) and disgust (permutation-based ANOVA, F¼ 2.84,
cutoff¼ 3.16, p (one-tailed)o0.05, N¼ 19), reﬂecting lower d 0s
in right AI than in both left AI and mACC (|diff-d 0s|Z0.21,
permutation tests of d 0 differences: |cutoffs|r0.21, Po0.05,
N¼ 19).
Overall, the analysis of UG data points to shared activity
patterns between pain, disgust and unfairness in left AI and
mACC. These responses in the UG might reﬂect a general
aversive affective experience shared with other primary negative
experiences such as pain and disgust, rather than the activation of
neuronal responses speciﬁc for a particular nociceptive or
distasteful sensation. On the other hand, evidence from right
AI suggests that part of the signal is speciﬁc to the experience of
unfairness, which converges with our previous analyses for pain
and disgust.
To summarize results from these analyses, we depicted for each
ROI separately the d 0-matrixes obtained from all within-task,
cross-modal and cross-target classiﬁcations (Fig. 2c). A clear
difference between the three ROIs is apparent, with the right AI
displaying higher-than-chance d 0s prevalently in within-task
classiﬁcations (on the outer diagonal line), whereas the left AI
and mACC displayed reliable d 0s also in many cross-modal and
cross-target classiﬁcations. Importantly, the absence of shared
effects in right AI cannot be imputed to reduced signal or larger
noise, as this region sensitivity to aversiveness in the within-task
classiﬁcation was comparable to that of other ROIs (in particular
left AI; see also previous sections above).
Whole-brain searchlight analysis. To test for additional brain
regions relevant for the encoding of unpleasantness across targets
and tasks, we repeated the pattern analyses using a whole-brain
searchlight approach as implemented in other studies7,32,33,41,42.
This approach has the advantage of not relying on a priori
assumptions about speciﬁc brain regions but looks for
discriminative local information throughout the whole brain.
Results from this analysis were entirely in line with those
obtained using ROIs. First of all, they conﬁrmed the role of left AI
and ACC in supramodal representations of negative affect, with
shared activity patterns across all conditions. In addition,
modality-independent effects were also observed in the
posterior portion of the superior temporal sulcus and the
inferior frontal gyrus, whereas the posterior cingulate cortex,
supplementary motor area and orbitofrontal cortex exhibited
modality-speciﬁc activity patterns. Please see Supplementary
Figs 3–7 and Supplementary Tables 1–7 for more details.
Discussion
Neuroscientiﬁc research has repeatedly shown that AI and
mACC are engaged in ﬁrst-person and vicarious experiences
of pain5,7,8,12,13 and disgust4,6,14,15, but also unfairness16,36–39.
However, the exact nature of the processes encoded in these
regions is still debated7,29,43. Here we tested whether AI/mACC
encode aversive states in terms of general affective features that
are blind to the modality (pain, disgust, unfairness) and the target
of the experience (self, other), or in terms of distinct modality-
speciﬁc or target-speciﬁc neural responses. By using MVPA,
we systematically compared the activity patterns elicited by
painful (electrical), disgusting (gustatory) and unfair (monetary)
events, directed at either the participant or another person.
Notably, the left AI and mACC disclosed shared neural
representations not only between ﬁrst-person and vicarious
Table 1 | Within-task pattern analysis.
d’ (corrected cutoff)
Left AI
Ps versus nPs 0.98 (0.32)**
Ds versus nDs 0.61 (0.29)**
Po versus nPo 0.49 (0.27)**
Do versus nDo 0.24 (0.26)*
Us versus Ms 0.30 (0.28)**
Uo versus Mo 0.19 (0.20)w
Right AI
Ps versus nPs 1.29 (0.32)**
Ds versus nDs 0.49 (0.29)**
Po versus nPo 0.36 (0.27)**
Do versus nDo 0.40 (0.26)**
Us versus Ms 0.33 (0.28)**
Uo versus Mo 0.38 (0.28)**
mACC
Ps versus nPs 1.61 (0.32)**
Ds versus nDs 0.65 (0.29)**
Po versus nPo 0.46 (0.27)**
Do versus nDo 0.53 (0.26)**
Us versus Ms 0.77 (0.28)**
Uo versus Mo 0.76 (0.28)**
F (cutoff)
Rep. Meas. ANOVA
Ps versus nPs 1.96 (3.54)
Ds versus nDs 0.62 (3.00)
Po versus nPo 0.21 (3.35)
Do versus nDo 0.91 (3.21)
Us versus Ms 3.18 (3.12)*
Uo versus Mo 4.57 (3.25)*
AI, anterior insula; ANOVA, analysis of variance; mACC, mid-anterior cingulate cortex; MVPA,
multivoxel pattern analysis; ROI, region-of-interest.
**Po0.05, *Po0.05 under uncorrected cutoff, wP¼0.06.
For each ROI, MVPA was conducted to assess the presence of multivoxel activity patterns
discriminative of one negative condition relative to its tailored neutral control. Detection of
negative events was measured as d0 coefﬁcients. Higher-than-chance detections are reported
when d0 values exceeded the 95th percentile of null d0-distribution (cutoff), obtained with 1,000
replications of the analysis on permuted data sets (see Methods section).
F values (and corresponding permutation-based cutoffs) from repeated measure ANOVAs
testing for ROI differences are also reported. Signiﬁcant effects are highlighted with
corresponding P values in the table.
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experiences (extending previous MVPA results for pain7 to other
domains), but also between different stimulus modalities
including pain, disgust and unfairness. Furthermore, we also
found neural responses speciﬁc to the modality and the target of
the aversive experience, particularly in right AI. These results
provide evidence for both domain-general and domain-speciﬁc
coding in AI and mACC, thus demonstrating how this network
might contribute to a comprehensive representation of aversive
experiences.
Studies in primates and humans previously suggested that the
insula might process ﬁrst-hand experiences of pain and disgust in
a sensory-speciﬁc manner. The posterior and middle insula are
thought to receive inputs from neurons in ventral posteromedial
thalamic nuclei sensitive to gustation22,23 and nociception24–26,
and then to project to the AI for higher level coding of affect and
interoceptive information19,44,45. However, the nature of the
information coded in AI has still remained elusive. On the one
hand, its sensitivity to a wide range of sensory and affective
experiences9,10,21 suggests that AI (and mACC) may not code for
modality-speciﬁc information, but rather represent more general
properties of affective experiences common to pain, disgust and
unfairness. On the other hand, anatomical studies on primates
point to several distinct subﬁelds in AI46, which are difﬁcult to
map in humans through radiological imaging, but nevertheless
appear consistent with highly specialized modules for different
sensory domains. The ﬁnding of shared activity patterns between
pain, disgust and unfairness in left AI and mACC strongly
supports the former interpretation, pointing to a supramodal
representation of negative affect transcending sensory domains
and event target. In this perspective, left AI/mACC might
respond to the unpleasantness of events and therefore mediate
signals of negative valence, or alternatively code for their arousal
or perceptual salience27–29. Note, however, that arousal and
salience also include positive affect. Future investigations will
therefore need to test whether the effects identiﬁed here extend
also to high-arousing positive stimuli.
Critically, a reliable part of our ﬁndings cannot be explained in
terms of general, amodal features of aversive experiences. Instead,
we found that activity patterns in right AI were speciﬁc for pain,
disgust, unfairness, as well as the target of the experience. Indeed,
overlapping fMRI activations are not necessarily diagnostic of
common underlying representations7,47, but might reﬂect the
presence of distinct (intermingled) neuronal populations related
to modality- or target-speciﬁc representations. MVPA is
well-suited to address these issues, as it investigates whether
idiosyncratic spatial variations in the neural signal are shared or
dissociated across experimental manipulations. Using this
approach, Chikazoe et al.47 found modality-speciﬁc represent-
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Figure 3 | Bar plots displaying d0 values from MVPA analyses in left AI, mACC and right AI. (a) Self-pain and -disgust. Bar plots display d0 values
representing the ability of a linear kernel SVM classiﬁer to detect activity patterns characteristic for ﬁrst-person experience of pain and disgust in ROIs
in left AI, mACC and right AI. Ps and Ds refer to within-task classiﬁcations of self-related pain (Ps) and self-related disgust (Ds) compared with their
respective neutral controls. Ps2Ds refers to cross-modal classiﬁcations between both self-related aversive events. (b) Others’ pain and disgust. D’ values
reﬂect within-task classiﬁcation of other-related pain (Po) and disgust (Do) compared with their respective neutral controls, as well as cross-target
classiﬁcations between aversive events directed at self and other for same modality (Ps2Po; Ds2Do) and different modality (Ds2Po; Ps2Do).
(c) Ultimatum game. Bar plots display d0 values related to the within-task classiﬁcation of unfair events (U) compared with midfair events; and the
cross-modal classiﬁcation between unfairness and ﬁrst-person pain (Ps2U) or ﬁrst-person disgust (Ds2U). Bars are coloured consistently to the
corresponding cells in the classiﬁcation matrixes displayed in each panel. The signiﬁcance of permutation tests comparing d0 values against chance
(or against values from other conditions) are also reported. **Po0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons for the three ROIs; *Po0.05 uncorrected.
Error bars refer to bootstrap-based 95% conﬁdence intervals. Single experiment, sample size N¼ 19.
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ations of unpleasantness in AI for gustatory and visual stimuli,
as well as modality-independent representations in medial
prefrontal regions. Our data extend these previous ﬁndings by
demonstrating that AI codes for ﬁrst-person pain and disgust
through both modality-speciﬁc and modality-independent neural
representations.
Taken together, our ﬁndings provide new and comprehensive
insights into the neural processing of various aversive experi-
ences. We show that the right AI contributes to modality-speciﬁc
analysis of gustatory/nociceptive inputs, whereas the left AI and
mACC might integrate the output of modality-speciﬁc computa-
tions into more abstract representations of these events. Future
studies will need to further examine the differential role played by
left AI and mACC in amodal processing of unpleasantness. For
instance, it has been proposed that mACC might integrate
negative affect, pain and cognitive control, presumably reﬂecting
a key role played by this region in the selection of behavioural
responses to unpleasant events48. Also the functional nature of
the differential lateralization within AI for modality-speciﬁc and
modality-independent processing remains to be elucidated.
This could be partially determined by the lateralized nature of
electrical stimuli (delivered on the left wrist), and consistent with
suggestions that the insula contralateral to the stimulation site
might process the sensory properties of a stimulus event, whereas
the ipsilateral AI might code for its subjective meaning25.
Evidence from experiments in which pain is delivered also
on the right side of the body might support this claim7
(see Supplementary Note 1 and Supplementary Table 8).
Alternatively, the right and left AI might exhibit distinctive
contributions of sympathetic and parasympathetic systems, with
the former involved in processing speciﬁc aversive events and
the latter promoting shared regulatory/coping processes49.
The observation of hemispheric differences in the disgust and
fairness tasks (where stimuli were not lateralized) supports the
latter interpretation. Overall, our results dovetail with seminal
theoretical accounts of insula function, according to which AI and
mACC mediate subjective feelings in terms of comprehensive
representations of affective states that integrate multiple sources
of information8,19,45.
AI and mACC were also engaged when participants observed a
confederate undergoing pain or disgust. This ﬁnding converges
with previous evidence demonstrating that these regions encode
empathic responses elicited by various cues about others’ negative
states (abstract symbols, facial expressions, injured bodies and
so on)4–8,11. The role of AI/mACC in both ﬁrst-person and
vicarious experiences has often been interpreted in favour of
embodied models of social cognition, according to which the
states of people are inferable by activating a representation of the
same state in the observer18,19. In support of this view, we
recently showed using MVPA that AI and mACC disclosed
common activity patterns between felt and observed pain7. Yet,
our previous results did not allow ascertaining whether the
information shared between self and others concerned modality-
speciﬁc or modality-independent features. The cross-modal
effects observed in left AI and mACC strongly support a
unique neuronal signature coding for aversive events regardless
of the modality or recipient of the experience. Critically, however,
we also found that activity evoked by vicarious empathic
experiences in right AI was not shared with that elicited by
ﬁrst-person aversive states. This ﬁnding is consistent with
previous evidence that human and monkey AI might process
social emotions in partial dissociation from ﬁrst-person pain43,50
or disgust51, and suggests the presence of target-speciﬁc neural
activity complementing the shared representations.
Taken together these ﬁndings support embodied interpretation
of left AI and mACC function, but at the same time circumscribe
their reach. While neural responses encoding ﬁrst-hand aversive
experiences are re-activated when empathizing with others, these
do not seem to contain modality-speciﬁc information related to
the nociceptive or gustatory input anymore. A more suitable
interpretation is that others’ states trigger a neural representation
of non-speciﬁc properties such as an unpleasant bodily
experience, which was an inherent dimension of all events tested
in our study19.
Finally, we show that neural signals in left AI and mACC
related to the ﬁrst-hand sensation of pain and disgust are in part
shared with those associated with unfair treatments in the UG.
Again no shared effects were observed in right AI, even though
this region disclosed reliable activity patterns for unfairness. This
suggests that right AI disclose modality-speciﬁc information,
not only for pain and disgust, but also for the experience of
unfairness, in parallel with an amodal representation of aversive
events in left AI and mACC.
Although AI and mACC have frequently been implicated in
unfair UG offers16,36–39, different accounts have been put forward
Table 2 | Cross-modal and cross-target pattern analysis.
d’ (corrected cutoff)
Left AI
Ps2Ds 0.31 (0.18)**
Ps2Po 0.21 (0.20)**
Ds2Do 0.19 (0.19)*
Ps2Do 0.30 (0.20)**
Ds2Po 0.18 (0.20)*
Ps2U 0.27 (0.17)**
Ds2U 0.32 (0.16)**
Right AI
Ps2Ds 0.02 (0.18)
Ps2Po 0.11 (0.20)
Ds2Do 0.12 (0.19)
Ps2Do 0.10 (0.20)
Ds2Po 0.23 (0.20)**
Ps2U 0.03 (0.17)
Ds2U 0.03 (0.16)
mACC
Ps2Ds 0.63 (0.18)**
Ps2Po 0.35 (0.20)**
Ds2Do 0.25 (0.19)**
Ps2Do 0.59 (0.20)**
Ds2Po 0.43 (0.20)**
Ps2U 0.44 (0.17)**
Ds2U 0.24 (0.16)**
F (cutoff)
Rep. Meas. ANOVA
Ps2Ds 6.77 (3.39)*
Ps2Po 1.66 (3.14)
Ds2Do 0.36 (3.06)
Ps2Do 4.08 (3.21)*
Ds2Po 1.54 (3.35)
Ps2U 4.56 (3.53)*
Ds2U 2.87 (3.16)w
AI, anterior insula; ANOVA, analysis of variance; mACC, mid-anterior cingulate cortex; MVPA,
multivoxel pattern analysis; ROI, region-of-interest.
**Po0.05, *Po0.05 under uncorrected cutoff; wF test P (one-tailed)¼0.05.
For each ROI, MVPA was conducted to assess whether multivoxel activity patterns
discriminative of one speciﬁc unpleasant experience (for example, self-pain) could detect
unpleasantness of another modality/target. Detection of negative events was measured as d0
coefﬁcients. Higher than chance detections are reported when d0 values exceeded the 95th
percentile of the null d0-distribution (cutoff), obtained with 1,000 replications of the analysis on
permuted data sets (see Methods). F values (and corresponding permutation-based cutoffs)
from repeated measure ANOVAs testing for differences in d0s across ROI are also reported.
Signiﬁcant effects are highlighted with corresponding P values.
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to interpret the functional role of these regions in the bargaining
game. Sanfey et al.16 suggested that AI activity might reﬂect an
activation of disgust-speciﬁc representation in insular cortex, as a
neural signature of ‘being disgusted by people’s unfair behaviour’.
This interpretation, in keeping with accounts suggesting how
representations of unmoral behaviour are grounded on personal
disgusting experiences20, is not supported by our data. Instead,
our ﬁndings ﬁt best the predictions of the wounded pride/spite
model, according to which unfair behaviour elicits a broad
negative emotional reaction in the observer52, with consequent
physiological and neural responses.
Note, however, that previous studies have suggested a role of
AI and mACC in the detection of equality violations in the
UG36,37. Our data do not rule out a fairness-speciﬁc
interpretation, since part of the predictive information about
unfairness in right AI and mACC was independent from ﬁrst-
person experiences of pain or disgust. Hence, it is possible that
AI/mACC process unfair offers in a multidimensional manner,
taking into account both the equality of the offer and its
emotional impact on individuals.
To our knowledge, our UG results are the ﬁrst showing that a
neural representation of ﬁrst-hand pain/disgust is re-enacted,
not only when empathizing with others, but also during other
unpleasant social experiences. Interestingly, several studies also
implicated the mACC during social pain, including aversive
experiences caused by social exclusion, rejection or loss53,54. The
role of the mACC in social pain has often been interpreted as a
re-activation of signals of physical pain54,55 (but see Woo et al.43).
Our data are in keeping with this interpretation, but only
under the assumption that physical and social pain share a
modality-independent representation of the unpleasantness of the
experience. Future studies need to formally test this hypothesis by
adopting the current decoding approach with the addition of
social exclusion.
In conclusion, the present study aimed at clarifying the nature
of information represented in AI and mACC, a network
commonly engaged in ﬁrst-hand pain, disgust or unfairness,
but also when witnessing others undergoing the same aversive
events. The recruitment of this network has often been
interpreted in terms of domain-general affective processing,
according to which these regions respond to common properties
of the affective experience such as unpleasantness. Our data
support domain-general coding in left AI/mACC while also
promoting domain-speciﬁc processing, particularly in right AI
that exhibited activity patterns uniquely distinctive for pain,
disgust and unfairness, as well as for the person to whom the
events were addressed. Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest that
the AI–mACC network might subserve a comprehensive, multi-
layer, representation of aversive experiences25,44,45, which takes
into account both modality- and target-speciﬁc information and
more general affective properties of the event.
Methods
Participants. Nineteen right-handed female volunteers (average age of
25.16±3.44 years, s.d.) took part in the experiment (see Supplementary Note 2
and Supplementary Fig. 9 for power analyses on independent pilot data). All
participants were accompanied by a friend (12 females) who acted as confederate
during the experimental session. Participants were free of psychiatric or neuro-
logical history and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They were all
compensated according to both the overall experimental duration (8h per hour)
and participants’ choices in the randomly selected trials of the UG task (see below).
Written informed consent was obtained from all participants and confederates. The
experiment was approved by the Ethical Committee at the faculty of Medicine of
the University of Leipzig (Ethik-Kommission an der Medizinischen Fakulta¨t der
Universita¨t Leipzig) and conducted according to the declaration of Helsinki.
Experimental set-up. Participants and confederates took part in three
experimental tasks implemented in blocks in alternating orders. The ﬁrst task was a
cue-based ‘empathy for pain’ paradigm (pain task)5, in which participants either
received an electrical (Ps or nPs) stimulation or were informed that their
confederate was about to receive the same stimulation. In the second task, the
cue-based empathy for pain paradigm was modiﬁed so that gustatory stimuli
(Ds or nDs) were delivered either to participants or to the confederates (disgust
task). The third task was the well-known UG paradigm in which participants were
presented with monetary offers (unfair or moderately fair), which were addressed
either to themselves or to the confederate35,37. Despite their differences, the
employed experimental manipulations converged in exposing either participants or
the confederates to aversive or neutral stimuli. This led, for each of the three tasks,
to a 2 (UNPLEASANTNESS: aversive, neutral) 2 (TARGET: self, other) factorial
design, and to an overall of 12 conditions. All conditions were implemented while
participants were lying supine in a MRI scanner and the confederates sat next to
the scanner table in the MRI room.
The pain task was organized as follows. Consistently with earlier
implementations of the ‘empathy for pain’ task5, each trial started with the
presentation of a coloured, arrow-shaped cue (2 s) that informed participants of the
target and the unpleasantness of the upcoming stimulation (see Fig. 1a). Arrows
pointing vertically downwards (k) indicated stimulations directed to participants
(self) while arrows pointing diagonally towards the confederate (.) cued
stimulations directed to the latter (other). The intensity of the cue’s colour
indicated the unpleasantness of the upcoming stimulation with light tones referring
to non-noxious (neutral) stimulations and dark tones referring to noxious
(aversive) stimulations. Different colours were used for self- and other-related
trials. Colour codes changed across participants. Cues were followed by an
electrical stimulation of 1 s (100Hz) that was applied to participants’ (or
confederates’) left wrist. Electrical stimulations were followed by a horizontal visual
analogue rating scale (5 s) ranging from  3 (highly unpleasant) to þ 3 (highly
pleasant). The direction of the scale was counterbalanced across trials to avoid
motor preparation during the preceding stimulation periods. Participants marked
the position of the scale corresponding to their judgment, by moving a slider
(randomized initial position) with the index and middle ﬁngers of their right hand
operating a button box. Trials were separated by an inter-trial-interval ranging
from 2.5 to 7.5 s (average 5 s) during which a white ﬁxation cross was presented.
Each of the four conditions of the pain task (pain stimuli delivered to self (Ps) or
other (Po), plus corresponding nPs controls (nPs and nPo)) was repeated 16 times.
As for the pain task, in the disgust task as well participants were initially
presented with cues (2 s) whose orientation (k or .) and colour informed about
the target and the unpleasantness of the upcoming gustatory stimulation (see
Fig. 1b). Colours were different from those used in pain trials and changed across
participants. Cues were followed by 0.5ml of liquid delivered on participants’
(or confederates’) tongues through the aid of plastic tubes. Participants were
instructed to keep the liquid in their mouth and taste it for 4 s, until a ‘swallow’
instruction (3 s) was presented on the screen. This ensured that movement artifacts
in the neural signal due to swallowing occurred prevalently after the stimulation
period. Subsequently, participants were asked to rate the experienced
unpleasantness of the gustatory stimulus on the same scale used for the pain task
(5 s). Finally, to minimize carry-over effects between subsequent trials, 2ml of
water were delivered via a separate tube to rinse (3 s), followed by another 3-s long
swallowing period. Trials were separated by an interval of 2.5–7.5 s. Each of the
four conditions of the disgust task (disgust stimuli to self (Ds) or other (Do),
plus corresponding neutral controls (nDs and nDo)) was repeated 16 times.
Participants didn’t report coughing or other trouble due to the administration
of gustatory stimuli.
Finally, we implemented an MRI-compatible version of the UG16. In each trial,
participants faced an unknown proposer who made an offer on how to divide an
initial endowment of 10h. The UG offers were addressed either to the self (standard
UG) or to the other (third-party UG)35,37. In self-related trials of the UG,
participants were told that if they accepted the offer, the money would be divided
between them and the proposer accordingly, whereas if they rejected it, both they
and the proposer would not get any money. In other-related trials, participants
responded to the offers on behalf of the confederate without any economical
consequence for themselves. Thus, if participants accepted, the money would be
divided between the confederate and the proposer while both got nothing if
participants rejected the offer. Proposers were described as 96 university students
from a different city (Geneva, Switzerland), which previously made one single UG
offer, thus leading to 96 independent 1-shot interactions with the participants
(recruited in Leipzig, Germany). Regardless of the cover story, participants faced
offers that were deﬁned a priori by the experimenters, and which ranged from
extremely unfair (the proposer offered 1 or 2h out of 10h (1:9, 2:8) and wished to
keep the remaining), to moderately unfair (3:7, 4:6) and extremely fair (5:5, 6:4).
Participants and confederates knew that 2 of the 96 bargaining trials (one self- and
one other-related) would be randomly selected at the end of the experimental
session and implemented according to the participants’ choices. Self-reports
obtained subsequent to scanning conﬁrmed that participants believed that the
proposers were genuinely human (average of 4.16±1.21 s.d. on a scale ranging
from 1 (I did not believe at all) to 5 (I absolutely believed)).
Reminiscently to the pain and disgust tasks, UG trials were introduced by a cue
(2 s) whose orientation (k or .) and colour informed about the target of the
upcoming offer. Unlike for the other tasks, UG cues were not informative of the
alleged unpleasantness of the upcoming event (same brightness for all six
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implemented offers). To increase the plausibility of the cover story, arrows were
presented together with a photo taken from the NimStim face database56 (48 males,
48 females displaying neutral facial expression; age ranging from 18 to 34 years).
Cues were followed by an offer screen (4 s), which was schematically represented as
two piles of coins (left for proposer, right for participant/confederate). The
proposed split was also explicitly reported beneath the piles. Participants responded
by pressing one of two buttons assigned to ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ as displayed at the
lower portion of the screen. Following their response, participants were asked to
rate the experienced unpleasantness on the same scale used for the other tasks (5 s).
Trials were separated by an interval of 2.5–7.5 s. Overall, the UG comprehended 48
self- and 48 other-related trials: 32 of these conveyed 1:9 and 4:6 offers (16
repetitions each), whereas the remaining 16 trials conveyed 2:8, 3:7, 5:5 and 6:4
offers (4 repetitions each). Based on individuals’ unpleasantness ratings, these trials
were then sorted into 4 subgroups of 16 trials each (unfair offer to self or to other
(U), plus corresponding midfair controls (M)) which were most closely matched
for unpleasantness with homologous conditions in the pain and disgust tasks.
Please notice that, for the purpose of the present study, we are focusing on UG
effects obtained when merging self-related and other-related trials together
Supplementary Fig. 2 report effects associated with each target separately.
Procedure and apparatus. Prior to scanning, participants and confederates
underwent brief thresholding sessions to identify electrical and gustatory stimuli that
elicited comparable levels of unpleasantness34 (see below). The scanning session was
divided into four functional runs. Each run was in turn divided into three blocks,
corresponding to the three tasks. A text string (3 s) informed the participant of the
task in the upcoming block. The order of blocks was counterbalanced across runs and
across participants. During the four functional runs, confederates were placed in a
chair next to the scanner with their eyes masked, and were cued for tasks and trial
conditions using different audible beep signals presented via headphones. Subsequent
to the four functional runs, we obtained functional resting-state data and a high-
resolution anatomical scan for each participant. During the resting-state session,
participants were instructed to keep their eyes open, to ﬁxate a centrally presented
white cross against a black background and to think of nothing in particular.
Following the scanning session, participants and confederates were debriefed. Each
experimental session took B2.5h.
Electrical stimulations to the left wrist were delivered via MRI-compatible,
gold-based electrodes attached to a DS7A Constant Current Stimulator (Digitimer
Ltd). Liquids were automatically presented via separate plastic tubes (diameter of
1.5mm) that rested at the tip of the tongue using a custom-build computer-
controlled pump-system. Tubes were ﬁxated to the head coil with a plastic holder.
Visual stimuli were projected on a screen (about 19 14 of visual angle) placed
inside the scanner bore. Key-presses were recorded on an MRI-compatible
response button box. The task was programmed using Presentation 14
(Neurobehavioral Systems) software.
Pain thresholding. The amplitudes of noxious and non-noxious stimulations
varied on an individual basis and were selected, for participants and confederates
separately, prior to the scanning session through a multiple-random-staircase
approach57. Computerized pain thresholding was realized using four staircases
of single electrical stimulations (ranging from 0mA to a maximum of 2.5mA).
Each electrical stimulus (1 s) was announced by a countdown (‘Stimulus in 3/2/1’,
duration of 3 s), and followed by a VAS ranging from 1 (barely detectable) to 10
(strongest imaginable pain) through which subjects rated their subjective pain
experience. Subjects had also the option to select a value of 0 (presented left to the
scale) to report imperceptible stimuli. Ratings were self-paced and followed,
after 200ms, by a new electrical stimulation from a different (randomly selected)
staircase. Two staircases aimed at identifying the subject-speciﬁc threshold
intensity of a noxious stimulus, whereas the remaining two aimed at identifying the
intensity of the non-noxious (but yet detectable) stimulus.
The staircases started with electrical intensities randomly ranging from 0.6 to
0.8mA (noxious stimulus) or from 0.25 to 0.45mA (non-noxious stimulus).
Subsequently, intensities were systematically increased or decreased by increments
of 0.08mA until the experienced pain exceeded or fell below a predeﬁned subjective
pain value. In that case, the staircase was reversed until the subjective pain value
was met again (turning points). Each staircase stopped once collecting eight
turning points (four below and four above the subjective pain value). Noxious
stimuli were calculated as the average intensity (mA) associated with 14 turning
points (the last seven of two staircases) around a subjective pain value of 7.5 (out of
10). Non-noxious (but detectable) stimuli were calculated as the average intensity
associated with 14 turning points around a subjective pain value of 1.5 (out of 10).
The subjective pain value used to identify noxious and non-noxious stimuli was
unknown to the subjects.
The noxious and non-noxious intensities identiﬁed through the staircase
approach were then re-tested in a second self-paced, computerized task that
required subjects to judge the subjective unpleasantness of stimuli on a VAS similar
to the one used in the experimental session. The pain stimuli were expected to elicit
subjective unpleasantness levels comparable to those triggered by the gustatory
stimuli, that is between  2 and  2.5 for noxious stimuli (on a scale from  3
to 3) and between  0.5 and 0 for non-noxious stimuli. If this was not the case, the
intensity of the stimuli was further adjusted. Overall, in 19 participants undergoing
fMRI, the pain thresholding procedure led to an average noxious stimulus of
1.2mA (±0.1, s.d.), and to an average non-noxious stimulus of 0.4mA (±0.03).
Disgust thresholding. Disgusting and neutral liquids were selected prior to the
experimental session to identify, for participants and confederates separately, two
gustatory stimulations whose unpleasantness matched the electrical stimuli used
for the pain task. In keeping with earlier neuroimaging studies6,58,59 and pilot data
collected on independent subjects (see Supplementary Note 1), negative stimuli
were chosen from three salt solutions (NaCl) of different degrees of dilution
(0.1, 0.5, 1mol) and three concentrations of quinine solution (0.25, 1, 10mM).
Neutral gustatory stimuli consisted of four solutions with the main ionic
components of saliva (25mM KCl and 2.5mM NaHCO3), diluted with various
amounts of distilled water (20, 40, 60 and 80%).
The thresholding procedure was organized as follows. On each trial, 0.5ml of a
solution were administered (via syringes without needle) to the subject who
evaluated the experienced unpleasantness on a VAS similar to the one used during
scanning. Three kinds of substance (salt, quinine, saliva) were administered
separately, with the order of substances and concentrations randomized across
individuals. For each subject, we selected one negative stimulus associated with an
unpleasantness range from  2.5 to  2 (on a scale from  3 to 3) and one neutral
stimulus with a rating from  0.5 to 0. Furthermore, subjects were screened for
their taste sensitivity concerning the gustatory stimuli using a labelled magnitude
scale with a continuous rating from 0 (barely detectable) to 100 (strongest
imaginable)60. The subjective taste intensities for the chosen negative solutions
were found to be within the range of 30–75, consistent with earlier studies59.
fMRI data aquisition. Functional imaging was performed on a 3T Verio scanner
(Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen) equipped with a 12-channel head coil. An
echoplanar imaging sequence (repetition time (TR)¼ 2 s, echo time (TE)¼ 30ms,
ﬂip angle¼ 90, 3 3 3mm, 1mm interslice gap, matrix size 64 64, 30 slices
tilted at B30 from axial orientation) was used to obtain T2*-weighted functional
images. Functional image acquisition was realized in 4 functional runs, each
consisting of 524 volumes (B18min, total of B72min). Functional runs were
divided by breaks of B2min, where no functional images were obtained. In
addition, we collected task-free fMRI time series, consisting of 200 volumes
acquired over B7min using the same sequence as the task-related fMRI. Sub-
sequent to the functional image acquisition, a T1-weighted high-resolution ana-
tomical image was obtained using a MPRAGE sequence (TR¼ 2.3 s, TE¼ 2.98ms,
ﬂip angle¼ 9, 1 1 1mm, matrix size 240 256, 176 sagittal slices, ipat¼ 2)
and a 32-channel head coil (B5min).
fMRI data processing. The acquired images were processed using the SPM8
software (http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). For each subject and for each
functional run, the ﬁrst three volumes were discarded. The remaining images were
corrected for head movement between scans by an afﬁne registration. In none of
the subjects, head movements within each functional run exceeded 3mm per
degree, conﬁrming that electrical stimulation and swallowing of gustatory stimuli
did not result in unusual movement artifacts in the present study. Subsequently,
to compensate for time-acquisition delays, each temporal slice was temporally
realigned to the 15th (of 30) reference slice through interpolation. The resulting
functional images were aligned to the T1-weighted anatomical image through
rigid-body registration, and smoothed using a 6mm full-width at half-maximum
(FWHM) Gaussian kernel.
We analysed the preprocessed data from our task-positive sessions using the
general linear model (GLM) framework implemented in SPM. For each participant
and in each functional run, the onsets of each trial were modelled independently,
yielding trial-wise parameter estimates of the conditions-of-interest7. In line with
previous implementations of the pain task5, for the pain and disgust trials we
considered relevant the neural activity associated with both the presentation of the
cue and the subsequent stimulation, thus leading to epochs which were 3-s (pain)
and 6-s (disgust) long (see Fig. 1a,b). For the UG, in which the cue was not
informative of the unpleasantness of the upcoming event, we modelled the epochs
in which the monetary offers were made (4 s) (see Fig. 1c). In addition, we also
modelled epochs in which the cues were presented as regressors of no interest (2 s).
All the resulting vectors were convolved with a canonical haemodynamic response
function as implemented in SPM. Movement parameters were included as
covariates of no interest. Low-frequency signal drifts were ﬁltered using a cutoff
period of 128 s. For each subject, this GLM lead to as many parameter estimate (bs)
images as experimental trials were employed in the study. These images were then
fed to multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA) routines.
Multivoxel pattern analysis. We run classiﬁcation-based MVPA to assess the
similarity between the neural representations of our experimental conditions. The
analysis was conducted by ﬁrst deﬁning a ROI and then by extracting, from each of
its constitutive coordinates, the parameters estimates (bs) associated with each
experimental trial. Furthermore, for each individual subject, and for each condi-
tion, response patterns were mean centred through z-transformation to ensure that
the MVPA analysis would not be biased by differences in the average ROI activity
across conditions61. Data were then fed into a linear kernel SVM classiﬁer (using a
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ﬁxed regularization parameter, C¼ 1), which operates by ﬁnding an optimal linear
decision boundary (hyperplane) that separates experimental classes with maximum
margin. New data (not used to deﬁne the decision boundary) are classiﬁed
according to which side of the hyperplane they fall onto62. Signal detection
methods were used to compute d63 as a measure of the sensitivity of the hyperplane
to detect, in new data, the occurrence of one aversive condition. Classiﬁcation
analysis was performed using the LIBSVM 3.18 software40.
Statistical validation of the average d 0 obtained at the group level was achieved
through rigorous non-parametric permutation techniques, following guidelines on
statistical assessment of decoding accuracies64. In particular, for each classiﬁcation
analysis, we created 1,000 permutation schemes aimed at breaking the relationship
between the data and the condition labels. Each of these permutations was applied
to the data of all subjects and all ROIs, which were then fed to the same
classiﬁcation routines used for the original data set. All the group-wise d 0 values
obtained through permuted data sets were used to estimate critical cutoffs, above
which an effect could be considered signiﬁcantly higher than null. More
speciﬁcally, to assess signiﬁcant (albeit uncorrected) effects within each ROI,
we used as cutoff the 95th percentile of the permutation distribution of 1,000
group-wise d 0s obtained from the data of that ROI. Following previous
implementations of P value adjustment in permutation-based multiple testing65,
we computed the permutation distribution of the 1,000 maximal group-wise d 0s
over all ROIs to provide corrections for multiple comparisons. The 95th percentile
of this ‘maximal group-wise d 0s’ distribution represents a reliable cutoff for d0s that
are unlikely (Po0.05) to be achieved in any ROI under the null hypothesis. Similar
permutation analyses were carried out to assess whether the d 0 difference between
two conditions (diff-d 0), or the value from standardized statistical tests (for
example, F test in a repeated measure ANOVA testing d 0 differences across ROIs),
were signiﬁcantly higher-than-chance.
As a manipulation check, we ﬁrst assessed the ability of a linear SVM classiﬁer
to discriminate between data associated with each aversive condition from the data
associated with its tailored neutral control (for example, Ps versus nPs).
Speciﬁcally, we employed leave-one-pair-out cross-validation, in which the 16
aversive and 16 neutral trials were randomly paired together. We then tested, in 16
independent folds, whether the data from each pair could be correctly classiﬁed by
a hyperplane estimated on the remaining 15 pairs. For each participant, we
estimated d 0 from the classiﬁed trials of all the implemented folds. This analysis
provides an estimate of the information about unpleasantness present in each ROI,
separately for each modality and target, regardless of whether or not it is shared
with other experimental manipulations (within-task classiﬁcation).
Subsequently, we ran cross-modal classiﬁcation that assessed whether a
classiﬁer trained to detect unpleasantness in one speciﬁc task (for example, Ps)
could discriminate unpleasantness from another modality (for example, Ds). The
analysis was conducted through 2 independent folds: we ﬁrst trained a SVM on the
32 trials associated with Ps and nPs, and then tested the ability of the estimated
hyperplane to classify the 32 trials associated with Ds and nDs. In the second fold,
we trained a SVM on the trials associated with Ds and nDs, and then tested the
estimated hyperplane on the trials associated with Ps and nPs. d 0 values were then
estimated from the classiﬁed trials from both folds. Reliable cross-modal
classiﬁcations (Ps2Ds) can be interpreted consistently with Ps and Ds triggering
(each relatively to its tailored control) a partly similar response pattern. A similar
approach was implemented to test for shared activity patterns across different
targets (cross-target classiﬁcation) (for example, Ps2Po), or for cross-modal
effects in different targets (Ps2Do).
The MVPA analyses described were ﬁrst run on a priori deﬁned ROIs of AI and
mACC (see below and Results). Furthermore, we implemented a searchlight-
decoding approach that does not rely on a priori assumptions about informative
brain region but searches for predictive information throughout the whole
brain7,32,33,41,42: for each coordinate of the individual native brain image, a
spherical volume-of-interest surrounding the coordinate was deﬁned (5 voxels
radius, 81 voxels total). The parameter estimates of all voxels in the sphere were
extracted and a classiﬁcation procedure similar to the ROI-based MPVA was
implemented. Resulting d 0 values were assigned to the centre voxel of the sphere
and the procedure was repeated for the next voxel. For each participant, this led to
d 0-maps which were then spatially normalized to the Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) single-subject template, using the deformation ﬁeld obtained
during the normalization of the T1-weigthed anatomical image. The resulting
normalized images were smoothed using a 6mm FWHM Gaussian kernel and fed
into group level analyses using one-sample t-tests to search for regions in which the
group-wise d 040. Voxels were identiﬁed as signiﬁcant only if they passed an extent
threshold corresponding to Po0.05 corrected for multiple comparison, with an
underlying height threshold of at least t(18)¼ 3.61, corresponding to Po0.001
(uncorrected). We used as extent threshold the 95th percentile of the distribution
of the largest cluster obtained through 1,000 replications of the same analysis on
permuted data sets. Second-level t-tests were performed using the SnPM toolbox of
SPM (http://warwick.ac.uk/snpm).
Resting-state analysis and ROI deﬁnition. We used group-independent com-
ponent analysis (ICA) toolbox GIFT 3.0a (http://icatb.sourceforge.net/) to estimate
the ICs corresponding to functional networks, based on fMRI data from the
resting-state sessions. Group ICA, which seeks ICs for the group data instead of
estimating networks separately for each individual, was chosen to avoid the
ambiguity arising from combining different individual networks obtained by
separate estimations. For this reason, the resting-state data from individual subjects
were fed to the same preprocessing routines of the task-positive sessions, with the
exception than functional images were ﬁrst warped in the common stereotaxic
MNI space before being smoothed with a 6mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. The
minimum-description-length algorithm66 run on the data estimated the number of
sources to be 28. Then, subjects’ data were reduced to a lower dimensionality by
using a two-stage principal component analysis (one at an individual level and one
at a group level). Then, data from all subjects/sessions were concatenated and
independent group components were estimated using the Infomax approach67. The
ICASSO method68 was used to assess the reliability of the networks by running the
algorithm 30 times, each time with different initial conditions and bootstrap
resampled data sets.
Figure 2a shows the IC implicating the bilateral AI and mACC, and therefore
corresponding to the relevant affective/salience network described in previous
studies28. Representations of AI and mACC in each individual native space were
obtained through an anatomically constrained functional approach. Back
reconstruction of the IC and time courses was done with the GICA3 algorithm69. The
resulting individual maps were masked by excluding coordinates outside of the insular
cortex (for AI) or the cingulate cortex (for mACC) as deﬁned by the AAL atlas70. The
resulting masked image was then warped into the individual native space using a
deformation ﬁeld inverse to the one estimated during normalization. We ﬁnally
selected, as features for the MVPA analysis, those 81 coordinates (same number as in
the whole-brain searchlight approach) in the native space that exhibited the largest
contribution in the IC-of-interest. For each participant, three individual ROIs were
created, corresponding to right and left AI and mACC. Supplementary Figure 8
depicts these selected coordinates in six different representative brains.
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